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In Thabo Mbeki’s speech to the European Parliament in 2004, he stated that ‘in the period of 
globalisation, no country or continent 
can be an island’. As the EU-South 
Africa Strategic Partnership (EU-SA 
SP) comes into its 10th year we note 
with this quotation that the partnership 
was not only initiated under Mbeki’s 
watch but was part of his architecture 
for South Africa’s future development. 
It is currently one of ten that the EU 
has world-wide and also one cog in a 
larger global context that Mbeki saw 
even then as essential for his African 
renaissance and vision for Africa. 
Casting aside realist assumptions about 
what a strategic partnership should 
entail, the EU-SA SP operates in a sea 
of other agreements, relationships, 
and regional organisations within a 
globalised context. 
There has been a recent trend in 
South Africa’s foreign policy to turn 
inward, and this affects its relations 
within the SP with the EU. Mbeki’s 
internationalism, while instrumental 
in hurling South Africa into the 
international system, was pitted (and 
not always equally) against his idea of 
African renewal and prioritising Africa’s 
development. A problematic balancing 
act between the international and 
the domestic, the pragmatic and the 
emotional, South Africa’s foreign policy 
endeavours were then considered 
conciliatory or ‘quiet’, and are now 
referred to in a somewhat derogatory 
fashion as ‘flip-flopping’. 
South Africa’s evolutionary path 
alongside that of Africa’s was and 
is a vision that is integral to South 
Africa’s own Diplomacy of Ubuntu. 
It has been described as a ‘butterfly’, 
working outwards from the body 
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(South Africa) to the emerging powers 
in the ‘South’ (Latin America and 
Asia). While this may appear a logical 
progression, it has at the same time led 
to an increasingly restrictive trajectory 
for South Africa: in the attempt to 
structure such a methodical path for 
development, South Africa has become 
counterintuitively more insular and 
continental. This has come at the cost 
of denying the global reality of South 
Africa’s geo-physical circumstances, 
and at the same time the possibilities 
of future self-realisation using the 
global arena.
The ambition to champion an 
Africa-first agenda as well as South-
South solidarity has become skewed to 
the extent that this is the only visible 
narrative. This is to the detriment of 
South Africa’s wider global context and 
alternative paths of development.  
Africa first, Trojan horse colonialism, 
and the EU-SA SP
A distinct thread can be traced 
from what began as a low hum of anti-
colonialism/anti-imperialism/anti-west, 
and less abrasively ‘Euroscepticism’ to 
the current discourse in decolonisation. 
The EU-SA SP itself has received little 
attention as part of this narrative, as 
anti-imperialist rhetoric had been 
levelled at the US. By implication, 
the EU apparently assumes itself 
to be included therein. While 
signaling a certain amount of ‘guilty 
conscious’, geographically speaking 
this is confusing to those in Europe for 
whom ‘the west’ is reminiscent of the 
cold-war era in relation to ‘the east’, 
and has no bearing on geo-location for 
South Africa itself.
Whatever one may think of the EU 
in general, or specifically in its relations 
with Africa and South Africa, the EU 
has consistently tried where it could to 
assist, having in mind its own ideological 
commitments. No less should be 
expected, especially as South Africa is 
interested in pursuing its own interests. 
The EU’s willingness to assist is no more 
evident than in the current SP with 
South Africa, where aims, objectives, 
and projects are South African driven. 
Over the course of the partnership, 
they have been dynamic, keeping 
pace with South Africa’s shifting policy 
expectations: since the launch of the 
National Development Plan (NDP) in 
2011, development objectives and the 
ensuing projects of the SP have fallen 
into line accordingly. The amount of 
aid assistance allocated towards these 
projects under the current multi-annual 
indicative plan (MIP) for 2014-2020 
is €241 million. This should signal to 
South Africa that the EU is committed 
to honour the ‘partnership’ subject. 
Strategic partnerships, however, are 
often perceived as coming with certain 
political, economic, and development 
expectations, more often imbued 
with suspicions of a Trojan horse and 
attempts at re-colonialism. 
There is no denying the money 
that has crossed over into South 
African projects and this in spite of 
the EU’s own fluctuating political and 
economic circumstances. This aside, 
South Africa’s external aid constitutes 
1.3% of its  budget, and 0.3% of 
its Gross National Product, putting 
to bed, somewhat, the idea that all 
partnerships, and this one in particular, 
are compromised by one side’s relative 
affluence over the other.
One is reminded that institutions 
(both formal and informal) have 
human beings behind them. And this 
is precisely the mistake that is made 
about the EU: there are many people 
behind the EU that try their best to 
carry out what they believe to be its 
good work. What emerges, however, 
from the combinations of the structures 
and the interactions of values against 
others it encounters, is often something 
entirely different. It should, however, 
be up to South Africa to carve an 
appropriate path. This it will find 
increasingly difficult to do with only 
one ideological mirror.
It is in this context that perhaps the 
relevance of the EU-SA SP to South 
Africa is best perceived.
In the more recent history of the 
SA-EU SP under the Zuma presidency, 
South Africa has traversed the line 
between ideal partner, and rogue 
(African) nation. In its supportive role 
of Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF regime, it has 
taken a more middle line approach as 
in its role as facilitator with SADC, but 
more recently overtly in favour when 
declaring the 2013 elections free and 
fair against most other accounts, and 
business has continued as usual. 
It would appear that this ‘flip-
flopping’ (and perhaps it is more of 
a semi-deliberate hovering), seen 
as detrimental to the shared values 
outlined in the Joint Action Plan of 
the SP, has worked so far for South 
Africa with the EU within the confines 
of the SP as it continues to function. 
The EU apparently has much stamina, 
or commitment, depending on the 
perspective adopted: how the EU in 
the future will address this ‘hovering’ 
in the SP remains to be seen. There is, 
however, both a perceivable mixture of 
exasperation, and not a little impatience 
growing with what can be perceived 
as political point-scoring at the EU-SA 
SP’s expense. It has become clear that 
while South Africa enjoys exclusivity on 
the continent in this manner, there are 
many others – pan-Africanist rhetoric 
aside – that would be extremely willing 
and less indecisive about embracing 
the preferential relationship and the 
geo-strategic advantages that such a 
strategic partnership has, does, and can 
construct.
A Child of its Time 
It is hard not to place the SP in the 
context of its birth and the Mbeki era 
of South Africa’s history. Both the SP 
overall and the Trade Development 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), 
which forms the SP’s core, have a 
strong competitive market ideology as 
well as an economically driven focus 
for development; all avenues lead from 
here in this respect and have informed 
subsequent [development] projects 
that reinforce this ideal. 
Resentment towards this economic 
belief system is well documented in 
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‘the South’ and has helped reinforce 
the idea of an externally led and 
influenced (or ‘captured’) state. 
More recently a particular ‘narrative’ 
has emerged that combines this aspect 
with a deep-seated sense of betrayal. 
Much of what is written about  South 
Africa’s early transition period is framed 
in these terms: William Gumede in his 
2005 Thabo Mbeki and the fight for the 
heart and soul of the ANC has described 
the contrivances of the domestic and 
international business community prior 
to the ANC government taking over in 
1994, as courting former presidents 
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki 
into maintaining a particular economic 
environment, a ‘business friendly’ one 
that guaranteed continued outside 
investment and allayed fears of an 
inward looking, anti-west development 
path seen as antagonistic to foreign 
investment. 
To say that Europe and what 
became the EU in 1992 has a long 
history with South Africa is of course 
an understatement. The SP with South 
Africa in fact, has a long and drawn 
out institutional lineage that has been 
built up consecutively, and slotted 
into larger frameworks such as the 
Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) and the 
Cotonou Agreement with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 
The TDCA, for example, was signed in 
1999 and in 2007 formed the ‘legal’ 
basis for the emerging EU-SA SP, 
collapsing old themes and overlapping 
new objectives into one. 
This is where cogs at the regional 
level fit into other cogs at greater scales 
in other combinations, coordinating 
actions driven by what is agreed and 
therefore assumed to be essential 
shared objectives, values, and interests 
along the way. Despite the fall-out 
expected from Brexit, the EU is still 
considered to be and remains the most 
‘dominant’ source of FDI in South 
Africa, as well as the biggest export 
market for South Africa.
In 2016 South Africa concluded 
its entry into the EU-SADC Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) and will 
replace the Trade provisions under 
the TDCA. The EPA has added value 
in that it includes additional interest 
for South Africa, involving the other 
areas of development cooperation for 
the EPA region: this should at least be 
coherent with South Africa’s foreign 
policy objectives as regards regional 
developmental approach.
The Strategic Partnership at 10 years
The strategic partnership has, 
from the South African side at 
least, gone through one distinctive 
period and is progressing through its 
second. These logically (although not 
coincidentally) have corresponded 
to the changing presidencies and the 
political consequences that have arisen 
during those periods. The first period 
coincides with the Mbeki presidency, 
followed by a holding pattern echoed 
in the transition between his recall and 
the incoming president Jacob Zuma. 
Under the Zuma administration, the 
SP has struggled more than should be 
necessary to find balance between 
international role player and pan-
Africanist, as exemplified in South 
Africa’s role within SADC towards 
Zimbabwe. 
Under these circumstances the 
EU-SA Strategic Partnership has 
become an experimental space for 
South Africa’s domestic politics, and 
external/continental ambitions rather 
than an opportunity to craft a position 
for itself and Africa in international 
politics.
Post-2012, there has been a definite 
shift in South Africa’s behaviour within 
the EU-SA SP at a high ‘political’ 
level, although the actual running of 
the SP has appeared to continue as 
normal. This is in spite of the obvious 
embarrassment and pique experienced 
by the EU, caused by political point-
scoring, anti-west sentiments, and calls 
for aggressive decolonisation.
South Africa has been reaching 
out to form new partnerships and 
communities across the globe and now 
increasingly in the so-called South. 
However, it would be unwise to ignore 
or delink from a still-considerable 
major player in the world. The rest 
of the globe will not fall away or 
disappear simply because Africa rises; 
as unpopular an idea as it may be, this 
has to be done with the rest of the 
world in context. South Africa’s SP with 
the EU does indeed put it in a unique 
position and one which, if South Africa 
is seriously committed to encouraging 
an African renewal, it needs to work 
with and not against.
Further it must be done within the 
context of the wider global community 
at the same time and not in a linear 
progression with Africa first, the South 
next, followed by others. This it can 
do, but it needs to stay the course by 
remaining in many partnerships, at the 
same time: only by taking part in the 
growing international arena, not opting 
out of certain areas, will South Africa 
continue to take advantage of the 
partnerships that are offered. 
There are certain points in history that 
once traversed, cannot be reclaimed. 
This may the case with the ideal of 
pan-Africanism in a globalised world. 
Imagining the same kind of integration 
and institutionalism that Europe has, 
however, may also have passed for us 
here in Africa. The structural aspect of 
globalisation may be possible to undo, 
but layers of systems of belief will take 
more time than perhaps Africa and the 
South have.  
As the SP completes 10 years, it is a 
the fact that the EU, with all its ‘exits’ is 
still the second largest economy in the 
world, and according to current OECD 
figures contributes $350 billion in 
official financing to Africa, outspending 
the US by $240 billion, and China by 
$255 billion: South Africa can choose 
whether to join in and participate 
with one of the most influential 
organisations on the planet, or try to 
reinvent international relations. That 
it has not, to date, actively sought to 
dismantle the basic agreements, is an 
indication that it is still prepared to 
participate.  ■
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